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ABSTRACT 
This article will address how Swedish scientists, physicians and public health officers tried to 
combat the polio epidemics in the pre-vaccine era. It shows that once polio was considered as an 
epidemic disease the preventive measures used were based on the hindrance of other infectious 
diseases. It also illustrates how epidemiological and laboratory studies to some degree affected the 
thoughts of how polio should be prevented, and that Swedish ideas and experiences differed from 
those put forward in the USA. 
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«NO OS COMÁIS ESAS MANZANAS; ¡HAN ESTADO EN EL SUELO!»: LA 
EPIDEMIA DE POLIO Y LAS MEDIDAS PREVENTIVAS EN SUECIA, DESDE 
LA DÉCADA DE 1880 HASTA LA DÉCADA DE 1940 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo trata sobre cómo los científicos, médicos y funcionarios de la sanidad pública de 
Suecia intentaron combatir la epidemia de la polio en la era anterior a la vacuna y expone que en 
cuanto la polio fue considerada como una epidemia, las medidas preventivas que se aplicaron se 
basaban en las de otras enfermedades contagiosas. También ilustra en qué medida los estudios 
epidemiológicos y los análisis de laboratorio influyeron en la manera de prevenir la polio y también 
demuestra que las opiniones y experiencias en Suecia eran diferentes a las de los Estados Unidos. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Epidemia de polio. Suecia del siglo XX. Medidas preventivas. 
 
 
The late summers and early autumns of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury was a time when piles of leaves and windfalls caused fear among Swe-
dish parents that built up into loud words of warning; Kids! Do not kick in the 
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leaves! Do not eat those apples; they’ve been on the ground!1 The reason for 
these alerts was that leaves and windfalls was linked to causing polio (or as it 
was labelled at the time; infantile paralysis) and children were the prime tar-
get for contracting the disease. That a polio infection could cause high fever, 
paralysis and sometimes even death was obvious to most people, but how to 
avoid being infected by the disease was long wrapped in obscurity. Before the 
introduction of the polio vaccine in the mid 1950s medical scientists and phy-
sicians had a difficult time understanding how the virus was transmitted, and 
consequently there was no clear-cut prevention to polio. Hence, the epidemics 
constituted a demanding challenge to medical science and public health insti-
tutions during the first five decades of the twentieth century.  
This article will address how Swedish scientists, physicians and public 
health officers tried to combat the polio epidemics in the pre-vaccine era. The 
sources used for this study include contemporary journals of medical science, 
documents from the Royal Medical Board (Kungl. Medicinalstyrelsen), and 
different pamphlets concerning polio. In order to be able to understand the 
effect of polio epidemics in Sweden the first part of the article is devoted to 
describing the historical epidemiology of polio and relies heavily on the de-
mographic records gathered by Statistiska Centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden) 
and the Royal Medical Board. 
 
 
POLIO FROM ENDEMIC TO EPIDEMIC 
 
Polio will forever be associated with one of the greatest successes in medi-
cal science —the polio vaccine. The first vaccine, the IPV, was developed by 
Jonas Salk and introduced in 1955. At the beginning of the 1960s the OPV 
vaccine was presented by Albert Sabin. Both these vaccines have been widely 
used and have helped in the efforts to eradicate polio from the world. Nevert-
heless, the history of polio reveals that the route to the vaccines was not a 
———— 
 1 POLIOMINNEN, KU 13538, 13732, 13741, 13739, 13746, 13758, 13759, 13613, 
13614, 13610, 13607, 13767, 13771, 13776, 13787, 13790, 13788, 13799, 13884, 13887, 
13891, 13993, 13994, 13995, 14002, 14003, 14004, 14008. Archive of Nordiska Museet. In 
1993 the Nordiska Museet together with The Swedish Association of Survivors of Traffic 
Accidents and Polio (RTP) asked Swedish polio survivors to send in letters to the museum, 
describing how polio came to affect themselves, their family and friends, and how it changed 
their lives. A total of 173 letters arrived at Nordiska Museet. The collection was named Po-
liominnen, and every letter has its own number. 
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straightforward path. When the first polio epidemics started to appear in 
Sweden at the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, epidemic diseases 
like smallpox, TB and measles had started to decline due to improved hygiene 
and sanitation, legislation, and vaccination. Polio epidemics, on the other 
hand, turned into an increasing problem. Polio transformed from an endemic, 
fairly unknown disease, to a fearful epidemic. Why?  
It is argued that polio has accompanied humankind throughout history. Be-
fore the major improvements in hygiene and sanitary measures of the twen-
tieth century, almost all children were exposed to the poliovirus during infan-
cy. But owing to protection from maternal antibodies, infantile paralysis was 
rare even though polio was endemic. Thus, children acquired immunity 
against the disease through exposure at an early age. However, due to the 
major hygienic and sanitary improvements of the late nineteenth century, the 
transmission of the poliovirus was reduced. Hence, children were not exposed 
to the virus and did not gain immunity during infancy; these children remai-
ned susceptible to the poliovirus later in life. When a sufficiently large pool 
of older, unprotected individuals existed, epidemics could appear. Because 
improvements in hygiene and sanitation first took place in western countries 
polio is considered a disease caused by civilization.2 
 
 
POLIO EPIDEMICS IN SWEDEN 
 
The USA is today often considered as the country most severely hit and 
affected by epidemics of polio.3 There is no doubt that the USA was terribly 
affected by polio —the New York epidemic in 1916 struck 27.000 people— 
but there are also other circumstances that contribute to shaping polio epide-
mics as an American experience. Besides the numerous American polio vic-
tims and the ravaging epidemics; the Salk and Sabin vaccines were developed 
on the continent, and as historian David Oshinsky has put it «[i]t was Ameri-
cas gift to the world;»4 they had the presence of the famous polio victim 
———— 
 2 SMALLMAN-RAYNAYNOR, M.R. & CLIFF, A.D. (2006), Poliomyelitis: A World Geo-
graphy: Emergence to Eradication, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 127. 
 3 ROGERS, N. (1992), Dirt and Disease. Polio before FDR, New Brunswick, Rutgers 
University Press, p. 10; OSHINSKKY, D. (2005), Polio. An American Story, New York, Oxford 
University Press.  
 4 Oshinsky is referring to the good publicity and the positive effects of the Salk vaccine 
being developed in the USA, in the midst of the cold war and the fight against communism. 
OSHINSKY (2005), p. 215.  
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt; and created the world-renowned National Foun-
dation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) and its March of Dimes. These and other 
events are manifested in the growing body of literature on experiences of 
polio in the USA, and contribute to the impression of polio being a peculiar 
American problem.5 Nevertheless, «statistically speaking», there are countries 
that suffered as much from the polio epidemics as the USA. Sweden is one of 
them, along with the other countries of the Scandinavian Peninsula. Especia-
lly Sweden had an early history of polio epidemics and during the 1911-1913 
epidemic, 10.000 polio victims were reported in Sweden.6 Polio historian and 
virologist, Dr. John R. Paul addressed this epidemic in his monumental A 
History of Poliomyelitis:  
 
The outbreak went far to strengthen the unsavoury and, I may say, unjust repu-
tation that Scandinavia had already acquired, of being not only the original source 
of the disease but a continuing breeding place for large epidemics. This reputation 
was to endure from the 1880s on —for almost forty years.7 
 
Even if the reputation may have ceased in the 1920s, Sweden continued to 
be struck by large epidemics until the introduction of the vaccine. The statistics 
in Figure 1, are dependent on how the countries handled the statistical reporting 
of polio. Nevertheless it is evident that Sweden, in relation to its small popula-
tion, had a very high incidence rate, above both the USA and Canada.  
Swedish polio epidemics are said to have begun in 1881, when physician 
Nils August Bergenholtz diagnosed and reported the world’s first epidemic of 
poliomyelitis anterior acuta in two small villages outside Umeå in the northern 
part of Sweden. The first account of an epidemic of poliomyelitis anterior acu-
ta in Sweden was reported in the fall of 1881 by Nils August Bergenholtz 
(1816-1922) a provincial doctor in the province of Västerbotten. He reported 
that on August 10, eight persons had come down with the illness in the vicinity  
 
———— 
 5 For further discussions on the American experience of polio see for instance SHELL, 
M. (2005), Polio and its Aftermath. The Paralysis of Culture, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press; SMITH, J.S. (1990), Patenting the Sun. Polio and the Salk Vaccine, New York, Anchor 
books; WILSON, D. (2005), Living with Polio. The Epidemic and its Survivors, Chicago and 
London, The University of Chicago Press; OSHINSKKY, D. (2005). 
 6 AXELSSON, P. (2004), Höstens Spöke - De svenska polioepidemiernas historia, Stoc-
kholm, Carlssons, (dissertation), chapter II.  
 7 PAUL, J.R. (1971), A History of Poliomyelitis, London and New Haven, Yale Studies 
in the History of Science and Medicine, p. 126. 
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FIGURE 1. POLIO INCIDENCE/ 100 000 IN SWEDEN, THE USA AND CANADA, 
1931-1953 
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Sources: FREYCHE, M. & NIELSEN, J. (1955), Incidence of poliomyelitis since 1920. En Poliomyeli-
tis, Geneva,World Health Organization Monograph series Nº 26., p. 99. 
 
 
of Sävar, about 30 km north of the city of Umeå. Six of them were young chil-
dren, but the two others were 14 and 17. In addition, four cases had occurred in 
the iron manufacturing community of Hörnefors bruk, 30 km south of Umeå, 
and all were children. Bergenholtz also reported one case from the city of 
Umeå. He wrote, «I am of the opinion that the illness is Poliomyelitis anterior 
acuta and its appearance as an epidemic is because the same cause of disease 
has simultaneously affected several persons.»8 Sweden experienced several 
epidemics before the turn of the century. From 1905 Sweden, together with 
Norway, suffered a nationwide epidemic forcing physicians all over the coun-
try to send in reports on polio victims to the Royal Medical Board, something 
they have continued to do ever since. This leaves historians of today with 
———— 
 8 Unfortunately Bergenholtz’s original reports nr 3696 and 4453 has not been returned to 
their original place in the Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet), Stockholm. Bergenholtz’ 
reports, however, were photographed and copied in their entirety and published in Svenska 
Läkartidningen. ANTONI, N. (1949), Barnförlamningen före 1905, Svenska Läkartidningen, 46, 
pp. 1181-1192; ANTONI, N. (1949), Det första bidraget till poliomyelitforskningen i Sverige. Ett 
meddelande från Kungl. Medicinalstyrelsen, Svenska Läkartidningen, 46, pp. 1193-1197. 
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good statistical material for understanding the demographic impact of the 
disease. Figure 2 displays the incidence rates of polio and shows that Sweden 
had no polio-free year during the pre-vaccine era. The disease has not been 
known first and foremost as a great killer, out of the 51.000 cases reported, 
between 1905-1962, there were 6.000 registered deaths. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. POLIO INCIDENCE/ 100 000 SWEDEN, 1905-1962 
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Sources: Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. serie: K1, A. 1905-1910. Sveriges officiella statis-
tik. Serie: Folkmängden och dess förändringar: Befolkningsrörelsen. 1911-1962. Sveriges officiella 
statistik. Serie: Hälso och sjukvården: Almän hälso och sjukvård. 1911-1962. 
 
 
The highest rates of incidence as well as mortality were reported in 1912. 
Case-fatality rates were between 15-20 percent until the 1930s when they 
started to decline partially because of the invention and use of the respirator9. 
More males than females died of polio but no suitable explanation has been 
put forward to explain this relationship. The material also shows that at the 
beginning of the 20th century polio primarily attacked children up to 10 years 
of age. At the end of the period polio found its victims in all age groups but 
mainly in the ages 15-39. Therefore, it can be assumed that Swedes born in 
the first decade of the 20th century always ran the risk of contracting polio. 
———— 
 9 AXELSSON (2004), p. 50. 
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IDEAS ABOUT POLIO EPIDEMICS 
 
So how did Swedish authorities cope with the threat of polio epidemics? 
George Rosen wrote in his influential book on preventive medicine, 
«[u]nderstanding the nature of a disease and the casual elements involved in its 
occurrence can to a greater or lesser degree provide a basis for its prevention.»10 
With Rosen’s words in mind, to be able to give a satisfying answer to this ques-
tion, it has been important to not only study arguments used in polio research 
but also the methods used by Swedish provincial physicians and public health 
officers in the period before the vaccine. Preventive methods changed over time 
and were based on how the medical authorities thought they best could fight 
back diseases in society. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
medical science became strongly affected by the establishment of bacteriology. 
It gave physicians and the public new ways to understand diseases. However, 
the change to a bacteriological view of disease did not take place over night. As 
late as 1911 some physicians in Sweden still argued that polio was a disease 
caused by miasma. The theory of miasma implied that disease was not caused 
by contagions but by putrefaction, i.e. «bad air» and should be combated with 
cleaner environments which often meant improved hygiene and sanitation.11 
During the 19th century discussions about the causes and prevention of di-
seases had mainly split physicians into two groups: miasmatics and contagio-
nists. The advocates of the theory of contagion could not prove how diseases 
were transmitted but only that some influence increased in some way. Howe-
ver, as historian Margret Pelling points out, these two groups were not diame-
trically opposed and sometimes diseases were believed to have «miasmatic-
contagious» explanations.12 These theories had implications for how physi-
———— 
10 ROSEN, G. (1977), Preventive medicine in the United States 1900-1975. Trends and in-
terpretations, New York, Prodist, Introduction. 
11 WENNERBERG, H. (1911), Ännu ett ord i poliomyelitfrågan, Allmänna svenska läkartidnin-
gen, 8 (48), p. 914; KLEFBERG, F. (1912), Militärtjänst och barnförlamning, Stockholm. Anne 
Hardy has pointed to the fact even though transmission of epidemic diseases could be explained by 
bacteriology from 1890 it was not before the turn of the century that the bacteriological perspective 
was implemented in the preventive measures in Britain. HARDY, A. (1993), The Epidemic Streets, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 6-7. See also: ACKERKNECHT, E. (1948), Anticontagionism and 1867 
between 1821, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 22, pp. 562-593; HEAMAN, E.A. (1995), The 
Rise and Fall of Anticontagionism in France, Canadian Bulletin of Medical History, 12, pp. 3-25. 
12 PELLING, M. (2001), The meaning of contagion. Reproduction, medicine and metap-
hor. En BASHFORD, A. & HOOKER, C. (eds.), Contagion. Historical and cultural studies, Lon-
don & New York, Routledge, pp.15-38. 
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cians and authorities tried to prevent epidemic diseases. If a disease was seen 
as contagious, quarantine and isolation of the sick was important. If it was 
perceived to be the result of putrefaction, preventive measures should be ai-
med at improving sanitation and hygiene. The hygiene movement in which 
many members were physicians, was a strong force in creating public health 
measures such as Hälsovårdsstadgan (1874) and Epidemivårdsstadgan 
(1875). These pieces of legislation attempted to improve the notification and 
control of disease. Due to polio’s unconventional epidemiology it is important 
to study how researchers, physicians and medical authorities discussed the 
causes of the disease and how they acted to prevent it.  
Sweden’s early epidemics enabled Swedish medical science to become in-
volved and the country early on acquired a leading role in international medi-
cal research on the disease. Karl-Oskar Medin, a pediatrician at the Karolins-
ka Institutet in Stockholm, made the first scientific examination of an ongoing 
polio epidemic in 1887. Because Bergenholtz never published his findings 
from 1881, Medin became famous when he, at an international medical con-
ference in Berlin in 1890, presented polio as an epidemic disease. Medin con-
sidered polio to be an acute infectious disease, affecting the nervous system, 
that could cause epidemics, but he did not consider it to be contagious.13 This 
may sound strange for us today, but it is possible to assume that Medin 
thought of polio as caused by miasmatic conditions. Medin presented no spe-
cific guidelines for how to prevent polio other than keeping healthy and sick 
people apart and some other very general comments based on advises for 
other infectious diseases.14 
It was not until the first nation-wide epidemic in 1905 that the disease was 
established as a contagious epidemic infectious disease and submitted to 
Hälsovårdsstadgan and Epidemivårdsstadgan. Pediatrician Ivar Wickman 
carefully investigated and mapped the more than one thousand victims of the 
1905 epidemic. He visited the homes of over 300 reported cases, and physi-
cians throughout the country helped with information on the remaining vic-
tims. The epidemiological picture showed that polio cases often occurred 
miles apart, with no obvious connections. By mapping these cases of polio, 
Wickman concluded that polio was often spread by people who appeared to 
be healthy but nevertheless were affected by the disease. Wickman named 
———— 
13 MEDIN, O. (1890), En epidemi af infantile paralysi, Hygiea, bd 52, 9 (1890), pp. 657-
668. See also: AXELSSON (2004), p. 73.  
14 Meddelanden från Kungliga Medicinalstyrelsen [Messages from the Royal Medical 
Board], No 8 (1905), pp. 8-10. See also: AXELSSON (2004), pp. 116-117. 
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these «abortive cases» and added that polio was to be seen as an infectious 
epidemic disease. Wickman also established insights into the incubation pe-
riod of polio. The course of a poliovirus infection is considered to have two 
main phases, a minor illness and a major illness phase. Wickman established 
that the time between contacts with an infected person and the development of 
clinical disease was three or four days (for minor illness) and eight to ten days 
(for major illness.) He became known worldwide for his conclusions and du-
ring the large epidemic of 1911-1913, Wickman's theory was largely accepted 
by medical science.15 
The methods used to investigate polio’s appearance were, until Karl 
Landsteiner and Erwin Popper’s discovery of the filterable virus in 1908, 
mainly based on clinical observation and epidemiological mapping. From 
1910 onwards, science turned to the laboratory, and monkeys where used to 
explore the characteristics of polio. Simon Flexner, the head of the Rockefe-
ller Institute, became a central figure in polio research. He established a way 
of thinking, investigating and explaining polio, and introduced the concept of 
the «olfactory route». Flexner and his staff were early on sure that they would 
find the cure for polio. The Rockefeller Institute researchers saw the disease 
as caused by a virus that entered through the nose, traveled via the brain to 
the spinal cord, and left the body the same way it entered.16 
Another way of thinking was established in Sweden during the epidemic of 
1911-1913. Researchers Carl Kling, Wilhelm Wernstedt, and Alfred Pettersson 
at the State Medical Laboratory (SBL) suggested that the disease was an alimen-
tary illness. Also using monkeys they discovered that the virus entered through 
the mouth, grew in the intestines, and left the body through the rectum, «the 
oral-fecal route». At a conference in Washington in 1912, the Swedish resear-
chers presented their results but Flexner disregarded them. The American scien-
tists could not repeat the Swedish tests and they discharged them as amateurish. 
The Swedish results were also overshadowed by American research on the bi-
ting stable fly as a likely animal for transmitting polio virus. Many years ahead, 
it would be discovered that the reason behind Flexner not being able to repeat 
the Swedish results was due to the use of different monkeys. The monkeys reac-
ted differently when exposed to the virus. Earlier historical research has argued 
that Flexner’s view on the epidemiology of polio dominated for a long time.17 
———— 
15 SMALLMAN-RAYNOR & CLIFF (2006), pp. 95-102; AXELSSON (2004), pp. 78-80. 
16 GRIMSHAW, M. (1995), Scientific Specialization and the Poliovirus Controversy in the 
Years before World War II, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 69, pp. 44-65. 
17 GRIMSHAW (1995), pp. 44-65; OSHINSKY (2005), pp. 124-127.  
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That may be true for the United States but research shows that in Sweden 
during the 1920s, Flexner’s thoughts were mixed with those expressed at 
SBL. This is evident, as we later shall see, in the preventive measures taken 
against polio. For example, there were no preventive measures taken or dis-
cussed to stop poliovirus from entering through the nose. Instead the focus 
was on personal hygiene and whether the disease was transmitted directly (by 
contact) or indirectly. Moreover, after studies supported by l’Office Interna-
tional d’Hygiene Publique in Saxony, and in Romania, Carl Kling and Constan-
tin Levidati put forward l’hypotèse hydrique in 1929.18 They used epidemiolo-
gical studies to conclude that the majority of cases occurred close to 
watercourses. Kling, who at the time headed SBL, also used studies from Swe-
dish epidemics in 1905 and 1911-1913 to state that polio must be seen as an 
alimentary illness. The theory did not gain general acceptance even among 
Swedish scientists, and as Margret Grimshaw has shown, Flexners view on 
Poliovirus persisted until around 1940.19  
In 1942, veteran polio expert Carl Kling, investigated the sewage systems in 
Stockholm. The impetus for his investigation was the findings of Trask and 
Paul of the Yale poliomyelitis research group in 1939. They had found traces of 
poliovirus in a sewage system and felt their study strongly supported the con-
ception of polio as a disease of the alimentary tract. Kling wrote in the article 
that the gastro-intestinal theory «has now begun to be accepted also by leading 
experimenters in the USA.»20 
As we can see there have been different ways of understanding how polio 
was transmitted. The subsequent section will more closely focus on how these 
ideas of polio’s transmission were implemented practically in Swedish pre-
ventive public health work. 
 
 
PREVENTING POLIO IN THE PRE-VACCINE ERA 
 
We do not know much of the efforts to prevent polio prior to 1905, when 
the disease became implemented into the Hälsovårdsstadgan and Epide-
mivårdsstadgan. At this point Medin wrote a specific guideline on how to 
———— 
18 KLING, C. (1929), Recherches sur l’épidémiologie de la poliomyélite, Svenska 
Läkarsällskapets Handlingar, bd 59, pp. 23-48.  
19 GRIMSHAW (1995), pp. 44-65. 
20 KLING, C., OLIN. G., FAHREUS, J. and NORLIN, G. (1942), Sewage as a carrier and dis-
seminator of Poliomyelitis virus, Acta Medica Scandinavica, 112, pp. 218-263, p. 246. 
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deal with polio that was published by the Royal Medical Board. In the guide-
line it was stated that the public must keep themselves and their surroundings 
in the best hygienic condition to avoid being struck by polio. Adults should 
see to that they and their children were clean and that dirty hands never tou-
ched food. The premises should be very hygienic, household waste and slops 
should be taken to places were children could not reach them. If someone was 
struck with polio a doctor was to be summoned if the person showed symp-
toms of paralysis. He or she could be moved to another room where laxatives 
should be given.21 These advices do not differ from guidelines for other infec-
tious diseases at the time.  
During the first nationwide epidemic in 1905 it is obvious from the reports 
by provincial physicians that polio was only seen as an epidemic disease in 
counties that were severely stricken by the disease. Hygienic and sanitary 
measures and isolation of the sick was a rule in the five worst affected coun-
ties. In other counties no specific measures were taken.22 
By the great 1911-1913 epidemic, Ivar Wickmans theory of abortive cases 
was accepted by a majority of physicians in Sweden and elsewhere. By way 
of his extensive epidemiological investigations of the 1905 epidemic, regar-
ding preventive measures, Wickman had emphasized that —in accordance 
with other epidemic infectious diseases— efforts to prevent polio should be 
directed to isolation of infected victims. Wickman pointed out that those 
abortive cases made it problematic but should, if possible, be isolated.23 There 
were also instructions printed in Swedish medical journals on how to cope 
with epidemic diseases and polio, diphtheria, nerve-fever and scarlet fever, in 
particular. These read that persons infected by polio should be isolated and 
their homes and belongings should be cleaned. It was also added that people 
that felt and seemed healthy (abortive cases) but had visited places where the 
disease had occurred, had a duty to, live by alone for a longer period of time 
and pay attention to their personal hygiene.24 
———— 
21 Meddelanden från kungliga medicinalstyrelsen, No. 8 (1905), pp. 8-10. 
22 This is based on evidence from reports that provincial physicians sent to the Royal 
Medical Board and available at the National Library of Sweden. During the 1905 epidemic, 
the five worst affected counties were Kronoberg, Skaraborg, Östergötland, Jönköping and 
Kalmar county. See also: AXELSSON (2004), p. 119. 
23 WICKMAN, I. (1906), Om den s.k. akuta poliomyelitens uppträdande i Sverige 1905, 
Bilagor till Kungl. Medicinalstyrelsens berättelse för år 1905, Stockholm. See also: AXELS-
SON (2004), pp. 78-84. 
24 WIRGIN, G. (1911), Åtgärder vid smittosamma sjukdomar (Difteri, scharlakansfeber, 
barnförlamning och nervfeber, Hygienisk Tidskrift, 4, pp. 295-314. 
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In the records of provincial physicians it is evident that districts handled 
abortive cases differently. A quote from a provincial physician referring to 
the 1911 epidemic in the northern part of the country read:  
 
In general [infected persons were taken] to epidemic hospitals for a variety of 
time, 3-to 6 weeks —but the abortive cases, they have been handled differently; in 
some places they have zealously worked to isolate even these, and in other places 
they have been left alone; very likely it has been practically impossible to carry out 
isolation.25 
 
In another county the responsible physician was worried and thoughtful 
regarding the preventive measures of polio. He wrote that polio seemed to 
behave differently than other infectious diseases. Normally, he would have 
been able to, sooner or later, reveal the source of the infection and that other 
epidemics stopped when using the guidelines of the Epidemivårdstadgan. He 
also added that the populace had been so terrified of polio that they had, more 
carefully than ever, lived by the law and not only demanded that all sick should 
go to the hospital; they had refused to interact with people from places that had 
been affected by polio.26 In other words we can conclude that the preventive 
measures regarding polio were based on guidelines made for other infectious 
diseases, and that they may have had little effect on the spread of polio. There 
were also reports sent to the Royal Medical Board that told of schools being 
closed, theatres shut down and that larger gatherings, like markets or funerals 
had been banned. Further, there are also some reports that speak of the good 
effect of the preventive measures, but they were not many.27 
In 1917 pediatrician Wilhelm Wernstedt published the results of a vast 
study of the 1911-1913 epidemic. He concluded that it had been very difficult 
to fight back the polio epidemic. It was not only time consuming, but also 
economically demanding to try and track down abortive cases of the disease. 
———— 
25 EDBERG, E. (1912), Om följderna af barnförlamningsepidemin i Norrland 1911, Allmän-
na svenska läkartidningen, 9, p. 7. [Offprint, available at the Royal Library, Stockholm]. 
26 Förste Provincialläkarens Årsberättelse, Älvsborgs Län 1911, bilaga 1, National Libra-
ry of Sweden. See also: AXELSSON (2004), pp. 93-94. 
27 Förste Provincialläkarens Årsberättelse Jämtlands Län 1911, p. 73; Förste Provin-
cialläkarens Årsberättelse för Västmanlands län 1912, p. 18; Förste Provincialläkarens 
Årsberättelse Uppsala län 1912, p. 17; Förste Provincialläkarens Årsberättelse Västernorr-
lands län 1911; Förste Provincialläkarens Årsberättelse Kamar län 1911; Förste Provinciallä-
karens Årsberättelse Stockholms län 1911; Förste Provincialläkarens Årsberättelse Älvsborgs 
län 1911, National Library of Sweden. See also: AXELSSON (2004), pp. 120-128. 
‘DO NOT EAT THOSE APPLES; THEY’VE BEEN ON THE GROUND!’: POLIO EPIDEMICS ... 
Asclepio, 2009, vol. LXI, nº 1, enero-junio, 23-38, ISSN: 0210-4466 35 
Wernstedt argued that once polio had started to spread to several places there 
were no use in performing preventive measures «that interrupted too much in 
the social and economic life of the society.»28 
Although Sweden reported polio cases and small local epidemics every year, 
after the 1911-1913 epidemic, there were no bigger epidemics until the 1930s. 
By that time Flexner’s ideas were widespread internationally. In the USA, espe-
cially during the 1916 epidemic, preventive measures such as quarantine and 
isolation of victims were used. Historian Naomi Rogers has shown that, in the 
US during the 1920s, those responsible for medical care primarily associated 
polio with filth and immigrants and were opposed to quarantine measures29. The 
major epidemic caused distrust among people and certain immigrant groups, 
mostly. Italians were blamed for being the cause of the epidemic30. Pointing fin-
gers at different ethnic groups had no effect in the long run, neither in the USA 
nor in Sweden. There is a note on Norwegian woodsmen as carriers of the disea-
se into the county of Jämtland in 1911, but the ethnic origin can not be said to 
have caused any concern among physicians or the public in the pre-vaccine era.  
In North America discussions on preventive measures were soon narrowed 
down to finding a vaccine and to find a way to stop the virus from entering 
the body. There were several tests carried out with serum, but after some 
years of optimism the serum seemed not to be the solution for the polio epi-
demics31. In addition there are numerous writings on the vaccine trail of Kol-
mer and Brodie in the mid 1930s, however they will not be further explored 
in this article. More interesting is the research on how to prevent the virus 
from entering the nose. Canadian historian Christopher Rutty writes that in 
the mid 1930s close to 150 different nose-sprays were tested on mice and 
monkeys. In 1935 in Alabama, USA, there were tests on humans. The results 
were difficult to interpret because there was no control group. In Ontario, 
Canada, in 1937, 5.000 children were «sprayed» (and they had a control 
group) in a trial followed closely by the Canadian press and radio. This trial 
showed clearly that the spray was ineffective and even gave rise to unwanted 
side-effects as many children lost their sense of smell and taste.32 There are 
———— 
28 WERNSTEDT, W. (1917), Kliniska och epidemiologiska studier över den andra stora 
barnförlamningsepidemien i Sverige (1911-1913), Stockholm, p. 1258. 
29 ROGERS (1992), p. 29. 
30 SHELL (2005), p. 32, p. 212.  
31 PAUL (1971), p. 197. 
32 RUTTY. C. (unpublished doctoral thesis), Do Something!... Do Anything. Poliomyelitis 
in Canada, 1927-1962, University of Toronto, pp. 106-112.  
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also records from Australia describing how special nose-clips were designed 
and handed out in the community of Kew.33 
What we cannot see, in the case of Sweden, is that physicians tried to find 
ways to incorporate the ideas of Flexner and his olfactory route. In Sweden in 
the 1930s, no nose sprays were tested or evaluated. In the mid 1920s tests 
with were serum done in Sweden as well but at the start of the 1930s the dis-
cussions on the effects of serum became more discouraging. Instead physi-
cians continued with the earlier known measures for infectious disease, but 
with the slight difference that they showed an increased interest in thorough 
investigations of creeks, wells and water systems when polio cases had occu-
rred. There were special forms that were sent out in order to investigate the 
role of water for the spreading of the virus. The idea behind investigating 
water was of course encouraged by Carl Kling’s and Constantins Levidati’s 
l’hypotèse hydrique. It is clear that Swedish physicians, in all parts of the 
country throughout the 1930s, focused particularly on water and food as pos-
sible sources of infection. Reports from physicians provide a complex picture 
of the epidemiology of polio. Some district physicians denied having seen 
any correlation between water, food and victims of polio, while others con-
firmed such a correlation to a certain extent. Particular interest was paid to 
how people got their drinking water, thus to whether or not they had wells.34 
In certain places they chlorinated the water as a preventive measure.35 During 
a polio epidemic outbreak in 1936, several provincial physicians expressed 
skepticism towards the preventive measures. One physician wrote that it see-
med as research on polio on the whole was in a stage of searching without a 
proper system.36 A physician in Western Sweden wrote in his report that he 
did not follow the Epidemistadgan. He claimed that it would be no use to 
isolate the sick or the healthy, to close down schools or forbid events as it not 
hindered the contagion but rather «contributed to fright the public and create 
panic».37 Nevertheless, the majority of reports sent in by physicians from 
———— 
33 SMITH, B. (1990), The Victorian poliomyelitis epidemic 1937-1938. En CALDWELL J. 
et al. (eds.), What we know about Helath Transition: Cultural social and behavioural deter-
minants of health, Canberra, Australian National University, pp. 868, 874. 
34 Förste Provincial läkares årsberättelser, Göteborg-Bohus län 1936, pp. 56-61. 
National Archives, Nordisk Medicin, 10 (1935), pp. 1456-1458.  
35 Medicinalstyrelsens arkiv, Hälsovårdsbyrån, E IIIb:1 Anmälningar om fall av barnför-
lamningar 1929-1945. National Archives. 
36 SÖDERBERG, B. (1938), Om ett intressant urinfynd vid poliomyelit, Allingsås, 4.  
37 Förste Provincial läkares årsberättelser, Göteborg-Bohus län 1936, p. 58. National 
Archives.  
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1920-1945 tend to have a rather analogous pattern. First and foremost the 
polio cases where taken to a hospital for epidemics diseases, sometimes fami-
ly members were isolated and their households were disinfected. These met-
hods, which focused on preventing the spread of polio, had been used since 
the implementation to the Epidemistadgan. Even after the introduction of the 
vaccine they continued to be of importance to prevent further spread of virus 
once polio cases had occurred.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Support for Flexner dissolved around 1940 when John. R Paul and others 
used bacteriological and epidemiological studies to confirm the theory of the 
oral-fecal route. That it took more than a quarter of a century for this theory 
to be accepted was according to Kling because «one of the foremost poliom-
yelitis investigators, Simon Flexner, ever since the beginning of the experi-
mental studies on infantile paralysis, has so one-sidedly maintained the role 
of the nasal mucosa as the portal entry of the infection, and that he has obtai-
ned so many adepts both in his own country and elsewhere».38 As late as 
1947, less than ten years before the introduction of the vaccine, the father of 
virology in Sweden, Sven Gard at the Karolinska Institutet wrote that the 
knowledge of the epidemiology of polio still was too uncertain to allow more 
concrete advise on prevention than general remarks of hygiene and sanita-
tion.39 The uncertainty among medical scientists was obvious among the pu-
blic as well. Letters from polio victims state that personal and domestic hy-
giene was important to fight back polio, but because polio epidemics were 
most common in the autumn the seasonal pattern was attributed to decaying 
leaves and the consumption of rotten or unripe fruits.40 The message was that 
to steer clear of polio these things should be avoided. 
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38 KLING (1942), p. 263.  
39 GARD, S. (1947), Barnförlamningens patogenes och profylax, Nordisk Medicin, 34, 
p. 1399.  
40 AXELSSON (2004), p. 141. See also footnote 1 for details. 
